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Abstract
What undermines cooperation in ethnically diverse communities? Scholars have focused
on factors that explain the lack of inter-ethnic cooperation, such as prejudice or the diffi-
culty to communicate and sanction across group boundaries. We direct attention to the
fact that diverse communities are also often poor and ask whether poverty, rather than
diversity, reduces cooperation. We developed a strategic cooperation game where we vary
the income and racial identity of the interaction partner. We find that beliefs about how
poor people behave have clear detrimental effects on cooperation: cooperation is lower
when people are paired with low-income partners, and the effect is particularly strong
when low-income people interact among themselves. We observe additional discrimina-
tion along racial lines when the interaction partner is poor. These findings imply that pov-
erty and rising inequality may be a serious threat to social cohesion, especially under
conditions of high socioeconomic segregation.
Keywords: Cooperation; poverty; ethnic diversity; cooperative investment game; discrimination
Introduction
Various research findings show that ethnoracially diverse communities have lower
levels of social capital and public goods provision than homogeneous communities
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Costa and Kahn 2003; Habyarimana et al.
2007; Putnam 2007; Robinson 2016; Schaeffer 2014). A common reason that has been
advanced to explain why ethnic heterogeneity may hinder the cooperative capacity of
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a community is racial prejudice (Allport 1954; Oliver and Wong 2003): negative atti-
tudes toward non-coethnics may negatively affect prosocial behavior. Even if no aver-
sion toward non-coethnics exists, other factors may undermine cooperation in
ethnically heterogeneous settings, such as differences with regard to norms of
cooperation, disagreement over preferred outcomes, or weak social networks and dif-
ficulties in communication and social control across ethnic groups (Algan, Hémet,
and Laitin 2016; Enos and Gidron 2016; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Kimenyi 2006;
Lieberman and McClendon 2013; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Winter and Zhang
2018). However, others have cautioned that the relationship between diversity and
cooperation may also be spurious. Ethnic minorities often have low social status,
and ethnically diverse communities are often also poor communities. Thus, poverty,
rather than ethnoracial diversity, might be at the basis of their lower cooperative ca-
pacity (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015; Gereke, Schaub, and Baldassarri 2018; Lawrance
1991; Sampson 2012; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).
Research in psychology and economics suggests that poverty produces a specific
mind-set: in particular, poor people are affected by “present-bias,” according to which
they tend to discount the future more than people who do not live in conditions of
chronic disadvantage. Namely, because they constantly face pressing needs (e.g., pay-
ing bills, repaying short-term loans) or more essential expenses (e.g., buying food for
their children, paying for medical emergencies), poor people tend to value immediate
rewards more highly compared to better-off people (Banerjee and Duflo 2011;
Haushofer and Fehr 2014). Poor people have also been shown to disproportionally
experience stress and cognitive burden/attentional capture (Banerjee and Duflo
2011; Mani et al. 2013; Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Shah, Mullainathan, and
Shafir 2012), which has been associated with lower saving rates (Karlan, Ratan,
and Zinman 2014).1
Extending this research to a new domain, we theorize that poverty may have neg-
ative effects on cooperative behavior. Community-level cooperation often generates
from a series of small, repeated, reciprocal gestures that builds over time into more
substantial forms of collective action (Baldassarri 2015; Gould 1993; Kim and
Bearman 1997). Poverty challenges this process. People experiencing poverty
may be less prone to engage in cooperative behavior because they might discard
the future benefits of cooperation, or might make commitments they cannot sustain.
In addition, poverty may also affect expectations: poor people might be considered
less reliable cooperation partners, and might have fewer opportunities to participate
in cooperative endeavors in the first place because others anticipate poor people to
be more present-bias and act accordingly (Bechtel and Scheve 2017).
In order to test this idea, we developed a novel experimental design. Our framework
allows us to capture how cooperative decisions aremade as a function of an interaction
partner’s identity. We experimentally vary both the partner’s racial identity (Black or
White) and their poverty status (richorpoor). In addition,wedistinguishbetweennon-
strategic behavior due to aversion toward racial outgroups and the poor, and strategic
discrimination based on expectations about others’ behavior. Strategic interactions are
1The causal direction between poverty and present-bias remains moot. While most research points to-
ward a causal effect of poverty on present-bias, we cannot exclude that individuals who exhibit present-bias
and high time discounting become poor in part because of these characteristics.
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captured with a new two-player behavioral game – the cooperative investment game
(CIG) – while non-strategic behavior is captured with a classic dictator game (DG).
We find evidence of strategic discrimination based on income: poor interaction
partners elicit substantially lower cooperation rates. Much of this discrimination is
due to participants who are low-income earners themselves. Race also matters, in
particular when the interaction partner is poor. While high-income Blacks com-
mand similar levels of cooperation to high-income Whites, low-income Blacks
are considered worse cooperation partners than low-income Whites.
Research Design and Methods
We conducted our experiment with 1,190 participants who we recruited in the
online crowdsourcing marketplace Amazon Mechanical Turk.2 The experiment
was programmed using oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016), and we pre-
registered our research design and analysis plan with egap.org.3 Here we present
in detail the most important components of our research design. Additional infor-
mation is available in the Supplementary Material.
Randomization of Partner’s Identity
When relying on observational data, scholars have no control over the intersection of
race and socioeconomic status, thus making it difficult to disentangle their effect on
cooperative behavior. In our experimental framework, we systematically manipulated
the identity of our participants’ interaction partners. Namely, we randomized the in-
come (alternating between “10,000–20,000$ per year” and “60,001–80,000$ per
year”), race (alternating between “White” and “Black or African American”), and gen-
der of the interaction partner while keeping his/her age constant. In particular, par-
ticipants were first asked to provide sociodemographic information about themselves:
their age, sex, household income, and race. They were then matched with another
participant and shown their partner’s demographic information in the same format
that was used to collect their own information (Figure 1). Using the same format, we
aimed at increasing the realism of the experiment while making explicit both the race
and social class of the partner. Moreover, by adding information about gender and
age, we reduced the emphasis on income and race, with the goal of making partic-
ipants less suspicious about the experimental treatment. This novel procedure over-
comes limitations of previous experiments on race, in which the race treatment (e.g.,
typical Black names) often goes hand in hand with perceptions of social class (Gaddis
2MTurk respondents are a diverse subject pool with respect to their age, ethnicity, and socioeconomic
status (Mason and Suri 2011), thus providing a pool that is more diverse than most lab experiments. They
are, nonetheless, younger and more highly educated than the overall population, and this likely makes our
results a low benchmark for assessing discrimination (cf. Table A9 in the Supplementary Material). Because
questions about both ethnicity and income are sensitive, it may help that the online interface affords more
anonymity over conventional laboratory environments. While experiments on convenience samples such as
MTurk have raised discussion about external validity, research comparing results from survey experiments
on a nationally representative population-based sample and MTurk have found considerable similarity
(Mullinix et al., 2015).
3The pre-analysis plan can be found at https://egap.org/registration/2375.
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2014, 2017). Thus, we adopted a 23 factorial design, in which the partner’s profile
varied according to gender, economic status, and race.
We are, however, mainly interested in the effect of the partner’s income and race
on our participants’ decision, and thus focus our analysis on the four treatment
conditions depicted in Table 1.
The Cooperative Investment and Dictator Games
Participants engaged in two decision tasks with their assigned partner: the CIG and
the DG. They were presented with these tasks in a random order and were informed
about their payoffs only after making both decisions.
Figure 1
Matching and visualization of partner’s profile. Screenshot from the experiment.
Table 1
Treatment conditions of interest and associated sample size
Partner’s race
White Black
Partner’s
income
Poor
($10–$20k)
N= 296 N= 287
Rich
($60–$80k)
N=− 316 N= 291
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The CIG is a two-player (“participant” and “partner”), strategic cooperation game
that has the structure of a stag hunt game (Skyrms 2004), and includes a time dimen-
sion. In the CIG, participants are given an endowment (here, ccC 150),4 and have to
decide whether they want to keep the endowment or invest it. If they decide to keep
the endowment, participants receive the amount immediately. Investing promises a
33% return on investment (here, a payoff of ccC 200) after a 2-week wait. However,
this return is only realized if their interaction partner chooses to invest too. If the
partner chooses not to invest, participants lose 20% of their endowment and still have
to wait 2 weeks to receive their reduced payoff of ccC 120 (Table 2).5
In the CIG, cooperation is the optimal solution if the participant is confident that
their partner will cooperate (and believes that the other person also holds this
belief). Cooperation tasks have been used before to study strategic discrimination
of non-coethnics (Enos and Gidron 2016; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001;
Habyarimana et al. 2007). Notwithstanding, scholars have tended to consider games
that capture the trade-off between individual and group interest, such as prisoner
dilemma or public goods games. In a one-shot prisoner dilemma game the optimal
solution is always to defect – defection maximizes individual payoff while inflicting
a loss on the partner, while in the CIG, an individual’s optimal decision crucially
depends on his/her expectations about their partner’s behavior. Cooperation is
the best option if the partner cooperates, while non-cooperation is preferable if
the partner does not cooperate. Finally, non-cooperation should not be considered
a neutral choice, because it inflicts a cost on the partner in case she/he cooperates.
The time component likens the CIG to cooperation situations where the reward
of a cooperative act accrues at a later point, and makes it sensitive to differences in
“present-bias,” the main mechanism through which we expect poverty to affect co-
operation. In an extreme scenario, for individuals with high time-discounting rates,
the cooperation payoff (133% of the endowment) may be discounted to the point of
being lower than the value of the endowment that is received immediately. For such
individuals, it is optimal not to invest. Participants in the CIG should thus gauge
Table 2
Payoff structure of the cooperative investment game
Partner
Keep Invest
Participant Keep 100% immediately/ 100% immediately/
100% immediately 80% in 2 weeks
Invest 80% in 2 weeks/ 133% in 2 weeks/
100% immediately 133% in 2 weeks
4Amounts were presented to the participants in the artificial currency C. $1 corresponds to C 325. The
conversion is done to make amounts and relative differences easier to understand.
5Since it is prohibited to implement real-time matching, our participants were matched with a person
whose sociodemographic profile corresponds to the partner described in the experiment. The person’s
decision in the CIG was recorded in a pre-test.
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their partner’s time-discounting rate, and how their partner will assess their own
time-discounting rate. The game was intentionally constructed this way to provide
a measure of cooperation that is sensitive to expectations about the partner’s will-
ingness to cooperate, and to reflect the fact that many real-life cooperation situa-
tions take time to come to fruition.
The randomizationof thepartners’profilesallowsus tocausallyassess the impactofa
partner’s racial identity and economic status on participants’ cooperative behavior.
Comparing across the four cells of Table 1, we ask whether being matched with a poor
Black partner, poor White partner, rich Black partner, or rich White partner makes a
difference in the way in which people behave in this strategic cooperative situation.6
In order to distinguish strategic considerations from aversion toward a partner’s
economic class or race, we measured prosocial inclination toward the partner with a
DG, a two-player allocation task that does not entail strategic interaction. This game is
traditionally used to measure altruistic behavior (Camerer 2003), and varying the
identity of the recipient makes it possible to assess “taste-based” discrimination
(Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2014; Becker 1957; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Whitt
and Wilson 2007). In the DG, a pair of players is allocated a fixed sum (here, ccC
100). One person in the pair is then selected as the decider and has to decide, anony-
mously, how to split the amount between himself/herself and the other player. In our
experiment, all participants were assigned the role of the decider. If our participants
held negative sentiments toward Blacks or the poor, we would expect overall levels of
contributions in the DG to be lower when participants are matched to partners
from these categories.7 Since participants were matched to the same partner for
the DG and CIG, contributions in the DG can also be used as a control for prosociality
in the analysis of CIG behavior, thus strengthening our interpretation of behavior
in the CIG as driven by strategic considerations rather than non-strategic
considerations.8
Hypotheses and Results
Hypotheses
Our main hypotheses concern the causal effect of the partner’s identity – namely
his/her race and economic status – on our participants’ cooperative behavior in
the CIG. First of all, we expect that participants matched with a poor partner will
be less likely to invest.
Hypothesis 1: Participants invest at lower rates in the CIG when matched with a
low-income rather than high-income partner.
6Among our participants, 77 individuals (6%) indicated that they were Black themselves. Excluding these
individuals from the sample marginally decreases the precision of the estimates, but leaves the substantial
results reported here unaffected. See Tables A4 and A5.
7The resulting dictator allocations were given to individuals in our sample that fit the profile of the in-
teraction partner. These payments were made after the conclusion of the data collection.
8In the experiment the DG and the CIG were presented in random order. That is, about half of our par-
ticipants (n= 579) engaged in the CIG first and then in the DG, while the other half (n= 611) first played
the DG, and then the CIG. All our models include a dummy variable controlling for the order of games
played, which in no case is statistically significant.
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Based on arguments made in observational research on the negative effects of
ethnoracial diversity, we also expect that:
Hypothesis 2: Participants invest at lower rates in the CIG when matched with a
Black rather than White partner.
Apart from testing these general hypotheses, we seek to determine whether
differences in behavior are likely to be driven by distaste/dislike, or by strategic con-
siderations. If lower levels of cooperation with poor people and ethnic minorities are
due to taste (e.g., dislike of Blacks, belief of poor people as undeserving, etc.), we
would find evidence in terms of lower contributions to poor and Black partners
in the DG. If, instead, cooperative behavior is mainly based on specific expectations
about the strategic behavior of minorities and poors, then we would not see discrim-
ination in non-strategic interactions like the DG, even though we would observe it
in the strategic CIG.
Hypothesis 3: If differences in behavior are driven by “distaste,” participants will
discriminate against poor or Black partners in the DG.
Results
We start our analysis by ruling out this last hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). In regres-
sions of the amounts sent in the DG on the partner’s income status and race
(reported in Table A1 in the Supplementary Material), we find little evidence for
taste-based discrimination. In line with other studies of the US population that have
used the DG (Abascal 2015; Fong and Luttmer 2011), we find that our participants
sent virtually identical amounts to Black and White partners. Along the income
dimension, we find that our participants give slightly more to poor partners (3%
points) – although this difference is only marginally statistically significant and does
not hold up when controlling for pre-treatment controls. We therefore believe that
taste-based discrimination plays a minor role in our experimental setting.
Next, we turn our attention to behavior in the CIG with the binary outcome
“invest”/“not invest.” Unlike the DG, this is a strategic cooperation setting where
expectations about the partner’s behavior factor in when deciding about one’s own
behavior. Results from linear probability models are reported in Table 3.9 Looking
first at the race dimension (Hypothesis 2), we see that the proportion of participants
who invest in the CIG when matched with a White partner is 47.5%. This proportion
is somewhat lower (–3.6% points) when participants are matched with Black partners,
but the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels (Table 3; Model
1). Controlling for pre-treatment covariates of participants (sex, age, race, education,
income, household size, occupation), as stipulated in the pre-analysis plan, does not
improve the precision of the estimates (Table 3; Model 2).
In contrast, playing the game with a rich as compared to a poor partner is asso-
ciated with a 3.7% points higher share of respondents that choose to invest – a dif-
ference that increases to 5.1% points and is statistically significant when controlling
for pre-treatment demographics (Table 3; Models 3 and 4). Model 5 additionally
controls for the amount passed on in the DG. DG donations are not strictly pre-
treatment, so this estimate is merely exploratory. Nevertheless, it is conceptually
9OLS is used for ease of interpretation; logit and probit models produce virtually identical results.
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Table 3
Regression of investment behavior on treatment conditions
(7)
Income class × player (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Low Middle High
High income × partner White 0.037 0.051** 0.061*** 0.114** −0.008 0.042
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.046) (0.053) (0.031)
Partner Black −0.036 −0.031
(0.025) (0.026)
High income × partner White ref.
High income × partner Black −0.015
(0.043)
Low income × partner White −0.036
(0.037)
Low income × partner Black −0.081**
(0.031)
Constant 0.475*** 0.427*** 0.439*** 0.384*** 0.254*** 0.441*** 0.519*** 0.281 0.341
(0.014) (0.044) (0.016) (0.053) (0.046) (0.038) (0.096) (0.304) (0.252)
Demographic controls – yes – yes yes yes yes yes yes
DG behavior – – – – yes – – – –
N 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190 382 388 420
OLS regression; DV: participant invested in the CIG; models 1 and 3: no controls; models 2 and 4: demographic controls as per pre-analysis plan; model 5: demographic controls and prosocial
behavior as recorded in DG; model 6: effects for the four combinations of poverty status and race; White high-income partners as reference category; model 7: treatment effects for different
income groups; standard errors in parentheses, *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
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informative: the estimate in Model 5 can be considered the effect of strategic con-
siderations net of the effect of “taste.” As can be seen, the coefficient is larger in size
and more precisely estimated, reinforcing the point that, if anything, “taste” reduces
discrimination in the CIG.
Both treatment conditions were randomly assigned, meaning our design allows
us to provide causal estimates of the simultaneous effect of race and income. For this
purpose, we coded a categorical variable that takes four values for White & high-
income, White & low-income, Black & high-income, and Black & low-income
interaction partners. White high-income partners serve as the reference category.
Results are presented in Table 3, Model 6, and Figure 2, which plots margins for
each partner category. Here we see that participants generally invest less when their
partner is poor, but that this effect is amplified when the partner is Black. High-in-
come Blacks elicit 6.5% points higher cooperation rates than low-income Blacks
(p= 0.051), while for White partners, the difference is a more modest 3.6%, and
not statistically significant at conventional levels (p= 0.343). That is, the coopera-
tion-reducing effect of poverty is only fully visible when the partner is Black. The
figure also shows that low-income Black participants elicit lower cooperation rates
overall than low-income White participants. Low-income Blacks are 4.5% points
less likely to elicit cooperation than low-income Whites, a difference that is mar-
ginally statistically significant (p= 0.084).
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Figure 2
Effects of the combination of partner’s income and race on cooperation in the CIG. Marginal effects
from OLS regression as in Table 3, Model 4. Investment decisions when matched with “poor partners”
depicted as black circles, when matched with “rich partners” as grey triangles; W stands for “White
partner,” B for “Black partner.” Indicated p-values are for pairwise comparisons. Solid lines indicate
differences that are significant at p<0.1; dotted lines, differences that are not statistically significant at
conventional levels.
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We conclude our analysis by looking at who is strategically discriminating
against the poor. We divide our participants in three income categories: low income
(no income to $30,000), middle income ($30,001–$60,000), and high income
($60,001–$100,000 or more), and analyze their respective behavior when matched
with low- or high-income partners (Figure 3). We find that most of the discrimi-
nation against poor partners is enacted by participants who are low-income earners
themselves: participants making less than $30,000 display a 11.4% points difference
in cooperation levels when matched with a high- versus low-income partner
(p= 0.022). The gap is much smaller, and non-significant, among middle-income
(−0.8% points, p= 0.881) and high-income (4.2% points, p= 0.196) participants.10
We point out that the true effects of this finding are multiplicative. To calculate
the probability for cooperation to take place in the CIG, the propensity to invest of
both interaction partners has to be taken into account. Thus, in our game, if a high-
income participant encounters another rich partner, the probability of a successful
investment is 30%. If a high-income participant encounters a poor partner, this
probability lowers to 24%. And if a low-income participant encounters another poor
participant, it is 14% – less than half that of an encounter between two high-income
participants.
35
40
45
50
55
P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 w
ho
 in
ve
st
ed
 in
 C
IG
Low−income
Participant
Middle−income
Participant
High−income
Participant
Poor Partner
Rich Partner
δ 11.4
(p= 0.022) δ−0.8
(p= 0.881)
δ 4.2
(p= 0.196)
Figure 3
Effect of partner’s income status (rich or poor) on investment behavior in the CIG for different income
categories of participants. Marginal effects from OLS regression as in Table 3, Model 7. Black circles
report participants’ investment decisions when matched with “poor partners,” grey triangles for “rich
partners.” Indicated p-values are for pairwise comparisons. Solid lines indicate differences that are
significant at p< 0.1; dotted lines, differences that are not statistically significant at conventional
levels.
10In a sensitivity analysis in the Supplementary Material, we show that this finding does not rely on the
particular cutoff chosen. There is substantial strategic discrimination among all participants earning less
than $40,000, while the picture is more mixed among those earning more.
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Our experiment does not allow us to point to the exact source of this strategic
discrimination of the poor against the poor. Our initial intuition was inspired by a
literature that suggests that the poor are often present-biased. We find, however,
that poorer participants do not invest less in general – indeed when they are paired
with a rich interaction partner, their investment rates are no different from those of
rich participants. Nonetheless, it appears that poorer respondents believe other poor
people to be present-biased and therefore discriminate against them.
Tentative evidence for this interpretation comes from an additional test that we
conducted on a reduced sample (n= 222).11 We removed the time dimension from
the CIG, holding all other aspects of the experimental setup constant. That is, in this
version, players did not have to wait 2 weeks for the investment to be paid out.
Removing the time dimension almost doubled the investment rate. More impor-
tantly, no discrimination against rich or poor partners was observable, neither
among wealthier nor among poorer participants. It thus appears that participants
take close notice of the time aspect of the game, and consider how the wait will
influence the likelihood to invest by a specific partner.
While we can exclude that mere inter-group animus is at the root of the discrimi-
natory behavior, and have produced evidence that perceptions of the partner’s
cooperative inclinations are important, we cannot entirely rule out that other/
additional reasons govern the behavior of our participants.12 Teasing out the exact
cause of the strategic discrimination behavior remains an important task for future
research.
Discussion
What undermines cooperation in diverse communities? Understandably, scholars’
attention has converged on the factors that make inter-ethnic relationships difficult,
from prejudice to weaker sanctioning capacity. Here we switched our attention to a
factor that many diverse communities have in common: poverty. Building on find-
ings on the effects of poverty, we explore the possibility that material distress may
undermine cooperative efforts.
Through a strategic game that captures the nature of cooperative dilemma in
multiethnic settings, we examined the effects of income and race on strategic coop-
eration. We find evidence for strategic discrimination against the poor, especially
against poor Blacks, while rich Blacks command the same amount of cooperation
than rich Whites. Intriguingly, strategic discrimination against the poor is enacted
by other poor people. This discriminatory behavior does not seem to be motivated
by a simple dislike of ethnic minorities or the poor. Rather, expectations and stereo-
types about foresight and lower strategic outlook among the poor, and poor Blacks
in particular, appear to explain the findings. This explanation is tentative, however,
and in need of more rigorous testing.
What are the implications of our findings? First, economic disadvantage, more
than ethnic diversity, might be at the basis of lower levels of cooperation in
11The full results of this test are reported in Tables A6 and A7 in the Supplementary Material.
12For instance, there is evidence of a penalty for Blacks among middle-income participants and, although
not significant, among low-income participants. See Table A8 and Figure A1 in the Supplementary Material.
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contemporary societies. Since minority status and economic disadvantage are often
associated, it is possible that the lower levels of cooperation that we observe in eth-
noracially diverse communities are not exclusively related to ethnicity, but rather
due to expectations about the short time-horizon of poor people. However, we
caution that our findings across racial lines (Black and White) in the USA may
not extend to other ethnic groups or to immigrants, or to other countries with a
different history of racial or ethnic marginalization. More work is needed to deter-
mine whether the mechanism we identified here also applies in other contexts where
ethnicity and poverty are entwined.
Second, our research design highlighted the extent to which cooperation is
contingent on the identity of interaction partners. Thus, to fully appreciate how
individual actions scale up into group-level outcomes – that is, community-level
cooperation – we must consider the social composition of the environment where
individuals operate. In particular, the USA has remarkable and persisting levels of
geographic segregation (Logan 2013; Massey 1990; Sampson 2012), and as a conse-
quence, social interactions are very homogeneous along racial and income lines.
That the strategic discrimination of the poor is mostly engendered by other low-
income people is, therefore, a result that is particularly worrisome for cooperation,
due to the multiplicative depressive effect that this might have on diverse commu-
nities. Growing levels of inequality (Piketty and Saez 2014) add to this scenario,
enlarging the pool of people that might experience the negative consequences of
poverty. In this perspective, policies oriented at lifting people from chronic poverty
might improve not only their economic conditions but also the cooperative capacity
of their communities.
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